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Abstract
We study a model of transmission of continuous cultural traits across generations where
children learn their cultural trait from their parents and their social environment modeled
by a network. Parents can engage in the socialization process of their children by biasing
links in the network in order for their children to adopt a cultural trait similar to their own.
In this endogenous network, we study the emergence of positive and negative role models,
the existence of a steady state cultural trait, its characterization in terms long-run influence
of each dynasty, and the speed of convergence.
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Formation
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1. Introduction
Culture plays a major role for economic outcomes (see, e.g. Guiso et al., 2008; Tabellini,
2010). How cultural traits form and evolve is hence of central interest to economists. There
is large empirical evidence that cultural traits are shaped by parents’ cultural traits and
the cultural traits in the social environment.1 Beyond that, social networks also play an
important role for the evolution of cultural traits.2
The seminal paper of Bisin and Verdier (2001) analyzes the purposeful intergenerational
transmission of culture and provides a theoretical explanation of the empirically observed
phenomenon of persistent cultural traits.3 Only recently some research, e.g. Buechel et al.
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1For instance, Dohmen et al. (2012) show that the degree of risk aversion and trust can be explained by
risk preferences and trust attitudes of parents and the social environment.
2It is documented that cultural traits often differ across geographic regions, e.g. cities (Guiso et al., 2008;
Voigtländer and Voth, 2012), or countries (Algan and Cahuc, 2010) and that these differences are persistent.
3For instance, Guiso et al. (2008) report persistence of trust levels in Italian cities, Nunn and Wantchekon
(2011) show that (mis-)trust attitudes in African families are prevailing throughout many generations, and
Voigtländer and Voth (2012) find that attitudes towards the Jewish population persisted over many centuries
in German cities.
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(2014), Panebianco (2014), and Prummer and Siedlarek (2017), extend this approach to
analyze the role of social network structure for the transmission of continuous traits, while
Panebianco and Verdier (2017) study random networks and discrete traits transmission.
These models, however, consider the network as exogenously given. Bisin and Verdier (2010)
note that “the cultural composition of society is at least partly under the control of parents:
they in fact choose schools, neighborhood, peers, and so on.” [p.352] and therefore discuss in
favor of a research program that studies the role of endogenous networks. This issue is also
acknowledged in Buechel et al. (2014) who note that “a time-varying interaction structure
[shall be introduced] to allow parents to control the whole network of their children.” [p.294]
In this paper, we introduce an endogenous network for the transmission of continuous
cultural traits. While we assume that dynasties are located on an exogenous social network,
we allow parents of each generation to bias positively or negatively each link of their children’s
network, identifying positive or negative role models for their children, and reacting by
increasing or decreasing the weights of the initial network. We assume that parents exert
costly efforts to change their children’s network because they feel imperfect empathy towards
their children expressing a desire to have their children’s cultural trait as close as possible to
their own cultural trait (see also Bisin and Verdier, 2001; Buechel et al., 2014, for analogous
preference). We study the consequences of this differential bias on the endogenous network
and on the long run effects in terms of cultural traits.
2. The Model
We employ the model by Buechel et al. (2014) and Panebianco (2014) for the transmission
of continuous cultural traits on social networks. Consider an overlapping generations society
populated by the adults of a finite set of dynasties N = {1, . . . , n}. At the beginning of
any period t ∈ N, each adult has one offspring. Adults of period t ∈ N are characterized
by a cultural trait Vi(t) ∈ I. As we consider continuous traits, I ⊆ R is assumed to be
compact and convex. Following empirical evidence, children learn their cultural trait from
their parents and their social environment which is determined by a social network which
stays fixed over time, for instance a city. The network is represented by a n×n row stochastic
matrix G = (gij)ij∈N which is primitive.4 The weights gij may represent time-independent
relative influences between dynasties, given for instance by the inverse of geographic distance.
The key novel contribution of this paper is that we allow parents i ∈ N to control the
relative influences of their children’s social environment given by the i-th row gi of G with
network biases di(t) ∈ Rn. The influence of each family j ∈ N is then altered from gij to
gij(t) := gij − dij(t). Since these are relative influences, we impose that ∑j∈N dij(t) = 0 to
retain ∑j∈N gij(t) = 1 ∀i ∈ N . The resulting network of relative influences is then denoted
by G(t) such that the cultural trait of a child of family i ∈ N is given by ∑j∈N gij(t)Vj(t).
4The assumption is satisfied if the network is aperiodic and strongly connected. Note that the same
assumption is also made in Buechel et al. (2014).
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At the end of any period t ∈ N, the adults die, the children become adults in period t+1,
and carry over the adopted trait into their adult period. The dynamics of cultural traits is
then defined by
V(t+ 1) = G(t)V(t) (1)
We assume imperfect empathy: parents want their children to adopt the same cultural
trait as they carry themselves (see for a motivation e.g. Bisin and Verdier, 2010). Moreover,
parental socialization is costly, resulting in the following functional form of utility,
Ui(t) = −[Vi(t+ 1)− Vi(t)]2 − 12ci(t)
∑
j∈N
[dij(t)]2 (2)
where ci(t) > 0 for all i ∈ N , t ∈ N. The first term of the RHS of (2) is the intergenerational
utility component which is decreasing in the distance between parent’s and child’s trait
and therefore reflects imperfect empathy. The second term is composed of the cost which
depends on the euclidean distance between the altered influence vector gi(t) to the original
influence vector gi weighted by the generation and dynasty dependent cost factor ci(t)/2.
While the intergenerational utility component follows along the lines of Buechel et al. (2014)
and Panebianco (2014), the cost component simply reflects the idea that cost is increasing
in the magnitude of the network change.
2.1. Optimal Network Choices and Role Models
In each period t ∈ N , the adults choose optimal biases determined by
arg max
di∈Rn:
∑
j∈N dij=0
− (Vi(t+ 1)− Vi(t))2 − 12ci(t)||di||2 s.t. Vi(t+ 1) = (g′i − d′i)V(t) (3)
where || · || denotes the euclidean norm, and x′ denotes the transpose of a vector x. Optimal
choices are characterized by Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. For each generation t ∈ N and for each dynasty i ∈ N , the entries of the
optimal vector of network biases as a solution to (3) are given by
d∗ij(t) =
[Vi(t)− Vj(t)] [Vi(t)−∑k∈N gikVk(t)]
ci(t) +
∑
k 6=i [Vi(t)− Vk(t)]2
, ∀j ∈ N. (4)
Defining by V¯i(t+ 1) :=
∑
k∈N gikVk(t) the unbiased trait obtained if the adult of gener-
ation t in dynasty i does not engage in the socialization process of its child, we receive:
sgn(d∗ij(t)) = sgn[Vi(t)− Vj(t)][Vi(t)− V¯i(t+ 1)] (5)
sgn(d∗ij(t)) determines whether dynasty j is a positive or negative role model for dynasty
i in period t ∈ N. Indeed, a positive role model has her final share increased with respect
to gij , so that d∗ij(t) < 0. A negative role model has d∗ij(t) > 0. Since it is generically true
that V¯i(t+ 1) 6= Vi(t), parents exert effort to have |Vi(t+ 1)− Vi(t)| < |V¯i(t+ 1)− Vi(t)|. If
Vj(t) and V¯i(t+ 1) are both smaller or both larger than Vi(t), then dynasty j contributes to
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influencing child i to move away from its parent’s trait Vi(t). Consequently parent i chooses
to reduce the influence of dynasty j i.e. d∗ij > 0. The reduction of influences could even lead
to negative final influence weights gij(t) such that j becomes an anti-role model with the
child adopting the opposite of those traits. If on the other hand Vk(t) is smaller (larger)
than Vi(t) and V¯i(t+ 1) is larger (smaller) than Vi(t) then k has a positive influence on the
child’s trait as this influence prevents the child’s trait Vi(t+ 1) to depart even further from
the parent’s trait Vi(t). In this case i will encourage the child to be more influenced by this
positive role model k, i.e. d∗ij > 0. For the very same reason, it is immediate to see that if i
has the smallest or the largest cultural trait, then she only has negative role models. This is
the only case where agents behave as in the Bisin and Verdier framework, as only the own
influence is increased. At last, notice that being a positive or negative role model is not
necessarily reciprocal, as we can have d∗ij(t) > 0 and d∗ji(t) < 0.
3. The Dynamics of Cultural Traits
Given these optimal biases, defining c˜i(t) := ci(t) 1∑
j 6=i(V
t
i −V tj )2
for all i ∈ N and plugging
(4) into (1), we get
Vi(t+ 1) = c˜i(t)c˜i(t)+1
∑
k∈N
gikVk(t)− (1− c˜i(t)c˜i(t)+1)Vi(t). (6)
The cultural traits of the next generation are a convex combination of the projected cultural
trait V¯i(t+ 1) and the current cultural trait Vi(t), with weights given by the cost term ci(t)
and the average cultural distance to other dynasties ∑j 6=i(V ti − V tj )2. In the long-run we
then get convergence to a single cultural trait.
Proposition 2. Let ci(t) > 0 for all i ∈ N , t ∈ N. Then, limt→∞ V (t) exists and is such
that all dynasties’ traits coincide, limt→∞ Vi(t) = limt→∞ Vj(t) for all i, j ∈ N
Although parents bias the children’s network in each period to achieve a cultural trait
close to their own, it is unavoidable in the long-run that a melting pot society emerges where
all dynasties share the same cultural trait.
As the dynamical system is time inhomogeneous since ci(t) ∈ R+ may vary arbitrarily
with time, we will use the following assumption on costs in order to obtain further results.
Assumption 1. For all i ∈ N , ci(t) = ci∑j 6=i(Vi(t)−Vj(t))2 for all t ∈ N such that ci > 0.
By Assumption 1, each dynasty i ∈ N experiences costs of changing the network given
by a dynasty specific base cost term ci > 0 weighted with the mean cultural distance to
other dynasties ∑j 6=i(Vi(t) − Vj(t))2. In other words, being able to change the network is
more difficult for outsiders, i.e. families who are far away from the mean cultural trait, as
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school choice and other network changes require more effort.5 With Assumption 1, we are
able to characterize the long run outcome.
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, the long-run steady state trait of all
dynasties i ∈ N is given by limt→∞ Vi(t) = x′V(0) such that x = 1∑n
j=1
cj+1
cj
yj
C−1y where
C = diag(ci/ci + 1) and y is the unique left unit eigenvector of G satisfying
∑
j∈N yj = 1.
By Proposition 3, long-run influence x only depends on cost term c = (c1, . . . , cn) and
the normalized left unit eigenvector y of G. Long-run influence of dynasty i ∈ N is hence
decreasing in ci and increasing in yi. Small base costs ci allow each generation of a given
dynasty to choose larger biases implying that cultural traits stay close to the parents’ traits
leading to a long-run persistence. A large entry in the normalized left unit eigenvector means
that a lot of other dynasties are influenced (directly or indirectly) in the underlying network.
I.e., when a dynasty is very central in the underlying network, then although this network
is altered in each period, the cultural trait propagates through the network more easily.
Propositions 2 and 3 may seem to contradict results of the classical literature on dynamics
of cultural traits where long-run heterogeneity of cultural traits is predicted when there are
only a finite number of possible traits (one prominent example is Bisin and Verdier, 2001,
while for a literature survey the reader may be referred to Bisin and Verdier, 2010). Instead,
in continuous cultural traits models, long-run convergence to a single melting pot trait is
frequently observed.6 The empirical phenomenon of long-run persistence is explained in these
models by low convergence rates (see Buechel et al., 2014). Similarly, in our model, biasing
children’s interactions to achieve a next period’s cultural trait close to parents’ cultural traits
slows down convergence which is shown via comparison of the second eigenvalue of the law
of motions associated with different cost terms.
Proposition 4. Suppose Assumption 1 holds and G is symmetric. Then, speed of conver-
gence of the dynamics V(t) is increasing in the cost vector c.
Note that if ci → ∞ for all i ∈ N , then no changes to the network are made and
convergence is fasted. Thus, allowing parents to change their childrens’ network slows down
convergence. What is more, for lower costs convergence becomes slower and slower. So while
we get long-run convergence to a melting pot society by Proposition 2, we may explain the
empirically observed phenomenon of persistence of cultural traits by very slow convergence.
4. Conclusion
This paper is the first attempt to build a cultural transmission framework in which the
socialization network is endogenous and shaped by parents. While standard models just
5Note that the assumption entails that when the cultural traits of all dynasties are aligned such that∑
j 6=i(Vi(t) − Vj(t))2 = 0, then there are no costs of changing the network. This however, only happens in
the long-run, if for the initial traits V(0) 6= a1 for all a ∈ R. In the latter case, the traits of all dynasties
equal initially such that there is also no incentive for any dynasty to change the network.
6One notable exception is the recent work by Cheung and Wu (2018) who employ a continuous imitative
dynamic to achieve long run heterogeneity.
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allow parents to bias in favor of own type, leaving unchanged the relative weights allocated
to the other groups, we allow parents to direct socialization to different targets. This enables
us to micro-found the emergence of positive and negative role models as functions of original
network structure and distribution of cultural traits in the population. In this way an
endogenous network of oblique socialization is built.
Studying the resulting dynamics of cultural traits, we have shown that, given any initial
network and cultural traits distribution, a steady state is always reached. Under some
simplifying assumption on the socialization costs, we characterize the level of cultural traits
shown in long run. We find that families with low costs of changing the network and a central
position in the underlying network, have strong influences on the long-run cultural trait.
Finally, we demonstrate that the changes made to the social network by each generation slow
down convergence. Moreover, the smaller the cost term, the larger is this effect, providing
a theoretical explanation for the observed persistence of cultural trait. While this is only
possible to be shown for the natural but quite specific assumption made on the costs term,
we expect these findings to hold more generally when parents engage in the socialization
process of children.
While this is the first attempt to have such a targeted vertical socialization, further steps
are needed in the analysis. First of all, the role of children is assumed passive, as it is the case
in all of this strand of literature. Allowing children to form their own network and engage
in the identity formation process shall be addressed in the future. At the same time, in the
dynamics, we consider the underlying social network to be fixed which we interpret as inverse
distances in e.g. a city. However changes to the network made by parents (or children) may
carry over to the next generation. In that case, future models of cultural transmission may
include inherited changes to the network.
A. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Since the relative influences after biasing must sum up to one, we
have ∑j∈N dij = 0 implying that dii = −∑j 6=i dij . Thus, we can rewrite (3), to obtain
(3) ⇔ arg max
(dij)j 6=i
− (∑
j 6=i
(gij − dij)Vj(t) + (gii +
∑
j 6=i
dijVi(t)− Vi(t)
)2 − ci(t)(∑
j 6=i
dij)2
Solving the system of n− 1 first order conditions j 6= i,
−
∑
k∈N
gikVk(t)− Vi(t)−
∑
k 6=i
δik(t)(Vk(t)− Vi(t))
 (Vi(t)−Vj(t))2 = ci(t)(Vi(t)−Vj(t))δij(t)
then obtains
δ∗ij(t) = (Vi(t)− Vj(t))
Vi(t)−∑k∈N gikVk(t)
ci(t) +
∑
k 6=i(Vi(t)− Vk(t))2
.
Proof of Proposition 2. Since (6) holds for all i ∈ N , we can write the dynamics of all cultural
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traits as
V(t+ 1) = [C˜(t)G+ (I− C˜(t))]V(t) (A.1)
where C˜(t) = diag
(
c˜i(t)
c˜i(t)+1
)
and I denotes the n× n identity matrix. The law of motion of
the dynamic system is hence defined by the n× n time inhomogeneous matrix
M(t) := C˜(t)G+ [I− C˜(t)] (A.2)
We then get, V(t+1) = M(t)·M(t−1)·. . .·M(0)V0. Note thatM(t) must be row stochastic
for all t ∈ N. By substituting S˜(t) := I− C˜(t) into (A.2), we get M(t) =
(
I− S˜(t)G+ S˜(t)
)
such that S˜(t) is diagonal with entries s˜ii(t) ∈ (0, 1) for all i ∈ N , t ∈ N. Thus, the result is
implied by Panebianco (2014, Proposition 2).
Proof of Proposition 3. By Assumption 1, we have that c˜i(t) = ci and hence by (A.2)
M(t) = M := CG+ [I−C] (A.3)
for all t ∈ N with C := diag(ci/(ci+1)). Since convergence of cultural traits is guaranteed by
Proposition 2, we have thatM(∞) := limt→∞M(t) = limt→∞Mt exists. Standard results on
power series of matrices imply M(∞) = 1x′ where 1 = (1, ..., 1) and x is unique normalized
left unit eigenvector ofM with∑nj=1 xj = 1. Using (A.3), we get 0 = x′(M−I) = x′C(G−I)
implying that x′Cmust be a left unit eigenvector ofG which is unique since rk(G−I) = n−1.
In other words, we get x′ = ry′C−1 with r = 1∑n
j=1
cj+1
cj
yj
to have ∑nj=1 xj = 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. Since G is symmetric and primitive, all eigenvalues are real and we
can order according to size such that 1 = λ1(G) > λ2(G) ≥ . . . ≥ λn(G).
Now, consider base cost vectors c, cˆ ∈ Rn with cˆi ≤ (<)ci for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and denote
the diagonal matrices C = diag(ci/(ci + 1)) and Cˆ = diag(cˆi/(cˆi + 1)), as before, and the
law of motions associated with these cost vectors by M and Mˆ, respectively. From (A.3),
we then get M − I = C(G − I). Note that C(G − I) and C1/2(G − I)C1/2 have the same
eigenvalues, sinceG is symmetric and C is diagonal. Letting Dˆ = diag((cicˆi+ cˆi)/(cicˆi+ci)),
we get Cˆ = DˆC and thus, Mˆ − I = Cˆ(G − I) = DˆC(G − I) = Dˆ(M − I). Analogously,
(Mˆ− I) and Dˆ1/2(M− I)Dˆ1/2 have the same (real) eigenvalues.
For the eigenvalues of both law of motions, we can apply Theorem 1 in Ostrowski
(1959), implying that λk(C1/2(G− I)C1/2) = θkλk(G− I), where θk are real numbers with
λn(C1/2C1/2) ≤ θk ≤ λ1(C1/2C1/2). Since C1/2C1/2 = C is diagonal with strictly positive
diagonal entries bounded above by 1, it holds that λk(C1/2(G− I)C1/2) > λk(G− I) for all
k such that λk(G− I) < 0. The latter is satisfied for λk(G) < 1, and thus for all λk(G) such
that 2 ≤ k ≤ n. We get, λk(M) = λk(M− I) + 1 > λk(G− I) + 1 = λk(G) for all 2 ≤ k ≤ n.
Analogously, λk(Mˆ) = λk(Mˆ− I) + 1 ≥ (>)λk(M− I) + 1 = λk(M) since the eigenvalues
(i.e. the entries) of Dˆ satisfy 0 < (cicˆi + cˆi)/(cicˆi + ci) < 1 as cˆi ≤ (<)ci for all i ∈ N . Thus,
speed of convergence of Mt is higher than Mˆt since λ2(M) ≥ (>)λ2(Mˆ).
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